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THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM IN CUSTODY AND CONFLICT
CASES: INVESTIGATOR, CHAMPION, AND REFEREE?
Dana E. Prescott, JD.'
I. INTRODUCTION OF A FUTURIST
The topic of this portion of the Symposium relates to the role of the
guardian ad litem in highly conflicted custody cases. A dry analysis of
the current state of the law concerning guardians ad litem did not seem
terribly interesting nor does it help evolve creative solutions for the
future.' As professionals of every category, we can surmise, based upon
experience and study, that a system of family patterns is common to
embattled families. The need to recognize and organize those patterns
is driven today by the sheer volume and intensity of conflict among
modem parenting relationships.' Unlike twenty years ago, much of this
conflict is no longer buried within the privacy of the family structure
but, in thousand of cases throughout the country, occurs within the
* Mr. Prescott is licensed in Maine and Massachusetts and Fellow of the
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.
1. An interesting article that summarizes the development of the law is Roy T.
Stuckey, Guardians Ad Litem as Surrogate Parents: Implications for Role Definition and
Confidentiality, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785 (1996).
2. See Andrew Schepard, Parental Conflict Prevention Programs and the Unified
Family Court: A Public Health Perspective, 32 FAM. L.Q. 95, 95-98 (1998). Professor
Schepard cogently states:
Twenty-first century family courts need better ways to help divorcing and
separating parents minimize the impact of conflict on their children. Social
attitudes towards marriage, divorce, and separation have changed radically
in the last half-century. What were once comparatively rare, fault-based
events discouraged by convention are today predictable stages in the life
cycle of an American child. Family court caseloads arising from divorce and
separation spiral ever upward with no stopping point in sight. Evidence
continues to accumulate that a child's future welfare depends on her parents'
ability to help her navigate the experience without lasting scars caused by
parental bickering and instability. Traditionally, family courts take the view
that their responsibility is to decide specific disputes between parents after
an adversary hearing. Evidence continues to accumulate, however, that this
traditional adversarial approach to divorce and separation drives parents
further apart, rather than encouraging them to work together for the benefit
oftheir child. Overall, adversary procedure usually does children more harm
than good .... This tidal wave of conflict which brings itself to family
courts can usefully be thought of as a disease with predictable symptoms and
courses of treatment. The symptoms of the disease are revealed in statistics
reflecting both public and private consequences: (]) the increasing and more
troubling caseloads of family courts attributable to parental divorce and
separation; and (2) the adverse emotional impact that continuing conflict can




public boundaries of a judicial system that must protect and secure the
best interests of children by rendering a legal allocation of parental
rights and responsibilities. Because the protection of children in modem
custody litigation frequently involves the appointment of a guardian ad
litem to represent the best interests of a child, it seems more productive
to try and predict the future by casting an eye on those patterns (at least
as this speaker identifies them) in the context of this question: Will the
guardian ad litem be Investigator, and Champion, and Referee for
children?3
In his famous book Future Shock,4 Alvin Toffler offered a futurist's
appraisal of war and peace, family and foe, social growth and cultural
stress. Unlike a fortune teller who only needs the spirits in the room to
make a prediction, a futurist by definition gathers contemporaneous
scientific, economic, technological, philosophical, religious, and cultural
data to formulate patterns from which to predict the "adaptive range" of
a system: whether political, societal, or corporate.
This search for the future (shock) by Toffler paralleled the interest
of physical scientists in a quest for patterns in nature as a means of
prediction. The interdisciplinary study of chaos theory and the search
for a mathematical proof of complex behaviors5 now underlies a whole
field of study devoted to the "totality of social structures."6 The object
of this "social investigation is to discover elements of a given system of
action which does not appear to observation until the completion of the
given interaction."7 Even within the primitive state of my analysis, the
3. See Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 152 (Wyo. 1998) (the guardian ad
litem's role "has been characterized as investigator, monitor, and champion for the
child").
4. ALVINTOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1971).
5. See M. MITCHELL WALDROP, CoMPLExrrY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE
OF ORDER AND CHAOS 1 1-13, 131-32 (1992). In physics, the modem distinction is
between complicated systems, "like computer chips or snowflakes," and complex
systems that "are more spontaneous, more disorderly, more alone than that" and the
adaptability of "chaos" theory that explains spontaneous, self-organizing dynamics of
the world. Id. For a brief but enlightening discussion of the science of chaos and
complexity theory, see IAN STEWART, NATURE'S NUMBERS: THE UNREAL REALITY OF
MATHEMATICAL IMAGINATION 120 (1995) ("Chaos contains its own brand of new
universal patterns."). See generally PAUL DAVIES & JOHN GRIBBIN, THE MATTER MYTH:
DRAMATIC DISCOVERIES THAT CHALLENGE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF PHYSICAL REALITY
(1992).
6. See STANLEY ARNOWITZ, SCIENCE AS POWER: DISCOURSE AND IDEOLOGY IN MODERN
SOcIETY 275 (1988).
7. See id. Applying the standards of scientific methodology from the natural and
physical sciences to the social and behavioral sciences is a topic of some sensitivity in
the literature but "we would probably all be equally as willing to admit that the
phenomena with which the human sciences are forced to deal simply do not admit as
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dynamics of a family system theory should begin with the model of
inter-disciplinary study undertaken by the physical sciences when
engaging in a quest for scientific development of chaos and complexity
theories.
Borrowing from many fields of study, therefore, our Futurist begins
by observing the contemporary environment in which family systems,
through parents, conduct combat-the judicial system 8-for the
specific purpose of predicting the role of the guardian ad litem in the
courts of the future. Defining a multi-disciplinary family system theory
for the courts, that recognizes patterns within embattled families, is not
limited to just mom and dad as variables. In contemporary life, the
variables include boyfriends, girlfriends, grandma and grandpa, and
their new spouses on both sides, friends, and other family members.
The management of these modem "families" requires a paradigm shift
that emphasizes identification and interdiction to protect children within
an embattled family system. Such a shift can only occur if patterns that
predict the need for interdiction or treatment are based upon a conjunc-
tion of scientific and legal experience. Whatever bumbling occurs, law
and science share a touchstone for children's needs that requires less
excuse-making and better solutions.
Toffler admonishes us, of course, to exercise care when embarking
on a path that tries to predict "facts" in a time of the "greatly accelerated
rate of change in society."'9 "In dealing with the future, at least for the
purpose at hand, it is more important to be imaginative and insightful
fully to controlled experimentation as did the subjects dealt with by classical physics."
JOHN W. SUTHERLAND, A GENERAL SYSTEMS PHILOSOPHY FOR THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES 93 (1973). One of the reasons that behavioral sciences are facing a backlash
in the courts is because data, and the conclusions derived from data, can be argued as
more politically-based than a function of the traditional scientific method found in the
physical sciences. See, e.g., Louise Silverstein & Carl Auerbach, Deconstructing The
Essential Father, 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 6 (1999). As one writer summarized about this
particular article: "It isn't an especially impressive article. Its prose is dry, its
arguments are shallow, its conclusions are disproyed by a mass of scientific evidence,
and its political bias is blatant-the authors end by calling for a 'large-scale' expansion
of welfare and electing more women to government." JeffJacoby, Attack on Fatherhood
a Political Screen Masquerading as Science, BOSTON GLOBE, July 26, 1999, at Al 5.
8. Our Futurist would also cast an eye backward so as to understand that divorce
has deep cultural and historical roots in the United States that have brought us to the
point in the enmeshing of families and the courts in the daily lives of many Americans.
See generally GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION (1991). Guardians ad
litem andjudges always do well to remember the Heisenberg Indeterm inancy Principle:
"The instrument of observation must be taken into account in the measurement of the
object as well as in the determination of its position . See ARNOWITZ, supra note 6,
at 330.
9. TOFFLER, supra note 4, at 11.
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than to be one hundred percent 'right.' Theories do not have to be
'right' to be enormously useful. Even error has its uses."'" So what
patterns are visible to the Futurist when observing embattled custody
cases and its relationship to judicial intervention?
First, serial marriage," non-marriage, divorce, separation, child
protective proceedings, juvenile criminal proceedings, domestic
violence, and the general dislocation of children for economic, familial,
or cultural reasons will remain unabated for the foreseeable future. 2 As
Toffler wrote thirty years ago: "The family has been called the 'giant
shock absorber' of society-the place to which the bruised and battered
individual returns after doing battle with the world, the one stable point
in an increasingly flux-filled environment. As the super-industrial
revolution unfolds, this 'shock absorber' will come in for some shocks
of its own."'3 The continuation of this familial shock, and the ensuing
chaos, thereby impacts rates of psychotherapy and medical treatment,
academic and employment failure, a lack of commitment to the existing
political structure, and, more profoundly, the relationship between
generations that traditionally transmitted the moral and ethical core of
any successful society."
10. TOFFLER, supra note 4, at 6.
11. Thirty years ago, Toffler wrote that "[s]erial marriage-a pattern of successive
temporary marriages-is cut to order for the Age of Transience in which all man's
relationships, all his ties with the environment, shrink in duration." TOFFLER, supra note
4, at 252.
12. See generally Parenting Our Children: In The Best Interest of the Nation, A Report
to the President and Congress Submitted by the U.S. Commission on Child and Family
Welfare 11 (1996) ("High rates of separation and divorce, as well as births to unmarried
parents, have led to over a quarter of the Nation's children living with only one
parent."); America's Children at Risk: A National Agendafor Legal Action, A Report of the
American Bar Association Presidential Working Group on the Unmet Legal Needs of
Children and Their Families (1993) ("The crisis of America's children is not limited
to the poor, to racial minorities, or to inner cities. Children of all ages and socio-
economic groups suffer from inadequate child care, lack of health insurance, the high
cost of housing, family breakdown and declining school quality. The majority of
American children will find themselves part of a poor or single-parent family at some
point during their childhood, and recent studies suggest that these children need even
more help." (internal citations omitted)).
13. TOFFLER, supra note 4, at 238.
14. Dr. Schacht makes the point that "[h]igh-conflict divorce is a major social,
economic, and public health problem. It is also source of potentially overwhelming
legal and interpersonal woe." Thomas E. Schacht, Prevention Strategies to Protect
Professionals and Families Involved in High Conflict Divorce, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REv. 563 (2000). An intriguing point is that the increase in the number of lawyers and
mental health professionals yields strangers who find the "ambiguity of anonymity" an
easy means to attack character and motive. See id.
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Second, courts will continue to be the vessel into which all this
chaos is poured. 5 By necessity, therefore, courts will evolve as more of
a social service agency than a separate constitutional branch of
government charged with the issuance of judgments within the
traditional boundaries of the "Law."' 6 Despite the claim that courts of
equity have the flexibility to create unique, individualized "justice,"
judges often decide cases within what feminist scholars term a dialectic
or binary logic: good/bad, best interests/detrimental interests, coopera-
tion/interference, abuse/non-abuse, or other pairings of this sort.
7
Third, the movement to make the courts "user friendly" may have
the corrective effect of convincing consumers that lawyers make "it"
worse (whatever "it" may be)." Usually, however, this institutional
15. See Mark P. Gergen, A Priest Responds to the Bean Counters: Leo Katz on Evasion,
Blackmail, Fraud, and Kindred Puzzles of the Law, 22 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 879 (1997)
("Consequentialists, or bean counters, believe that the law should maximize human
happiness, human welfare, or wealth."). Although the "lofty, theoretical, and
jurisprudential" dialogue is interesting, the legal system benefits when it deals with the
chaos by avoiding the appearance of arbitrariness and is responsive to solutions to real
problems. See Catherine J. Ross, The Failure of Fragmentation: The Promise of a System
of Unified Family Courts, 33 REv. JuR. U.I.P.R. 311, 312 (1999).
16. A parallel evolution may be occurring in public school systems which are
forced to act as parenspatriae for the volume of children constructively abandoned by
biological parents. See Linda D. Elrod, Restructuring Schools as Families: Report of a
Conference, 28 FAM. L.Q. 347 (1994). This trend finds its best reflection in the
impressive debate over the creation of unified family courts. See Jay Folberg, Family
Courts: Assessing the Trade-Offs, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 448 (1999)
("Consolidated family courts using judicial specialists dealing with multiple
interrelated parties and integrating an array of social services appears to offer a better
approach to related party cases."); Barbara A. Babb, Fashioning an Interdisciplinary
Frameworkfor Court Reform in Family Law: A Blueprint to Construct a Unied Family Court,
71 S. CAL. L. REv. 469 (1998) (organizing in detail a model for "theraputic
jurisprudence").
17. See JAMEs A. WINDERs, GENDER, THEORY, AND THE CANON 44-47 (1991).
18. Ignoring the gender specific, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's reasoning
concerning the role of lawyers is no less meritorious today than a hundred years ago:
An order of men, honorable, enlightened, learned in the law, and skilled in
legal procedure, is essential to the beneficent administration of'justice. The
aid of such men is now practically indispensable to the orderly, accurate, and
equitable determination and adjustment of legal rights and duties. While the
right of every person to conduct his own litigation should be scrupulously
respected, he should not be discouraged, but rather encouraged, in early
seeking the assistance or advice of a good lawyer upon any question of legal
right. In order that the lawyer may properly perform his important function,
he should be fully informed of all facts possibly bearing upon the question.
The person consulting a lawyer should be encouraged to communicate all
such facts without fear that his statements may be possibly used against him.
For these reasons the rule above stated should be construed liberally in favor
of those seeking legal advice. It does not apply, of course, where it is sought
533
UALR LAW REVIEW
narcissism is driven by administrators at the appellate level and not trial
judges who must cope daily with the onslaught of highly emotional case
loads, most especially the explosion of private protection from abuse
and harassment cases between private individuals. Consequently, the
percentage of pro se litigants on one or both sides of a family law case
is increasing and the advent of forms, the Internet, and the abrogation of
rules prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law, means this trend is
likely to continue. 9
In the absence of lawyers, judges will need more access to
parenting education courses, mediators, guardians ad litem, therapists,
and social workers within the court system.2" In practice, this reorgani-
zation of the courts to directly deliver social services to consumers,
rather thanjudgments based upon actual evidence, increases the need for
more sensitive consideration of how the courts are going to facilitate
these services, especially the protection of victims of domestic
abuse/violence2 and the treatment of addiction disorders. Even if
budget limitations and political conflicts are ignored, successful
"delivery" assumes a generation of professional service providers who
can master the techniques of handling conflicts between parents without
sufficient emotional, intellectual, and ethical/moral moorings to make
non-selfish decisions for their child. Judges cannot waive a wand that
will suddenly imbue parents with a sense of honor, dignity, tact,
cooperation, understanding, and other traits that seemingly played a role
in the negotiation and cooperation (it used to be called courtship)
to find a way to violate some law.
Wade v. Ridley, 32 A. 975, 976 ( Me. 1895).
19. The statistical data is complied in Robert B. Yegge, Divorce Litigants Without
Lawyers, 28 FAM. L.Q. 407 (1994). The juvenile justice system itself may by defined
as a "complex web of individuals bound together by esoteric laws and mind-boggling
funding structures." JOHN HUBNER & JILL WOLFSON, SOMEBODY ELSE'S CHILDREN: THE
COURTS, THE KIDS, AND THE STRUGGLE TO SAVE AMERICA'S TROUBLED FAMILIES vii (1996).
20. Some of these issues are discussed in Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling of Legal
Services and the Family Lawyer, 28 FAM. L.Q. 421 (1994).
21. A fascinating article on this topic is Linda G. Mills, On the Other Side ofSilence:
Affective Lawyering for Intimate Abuse, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1225, 1254 (1996) ("To
address the emotional and doctrinal complexities and demands ofparticularizedjustice,
some feminist theorists have proposed an agenda which adopts so-called relational
notions of justice, that is, systems which recognize social interaction and intimate
relations as their cornerstone.").
[Vol. 22
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necessary to conceive a child.22 In words three decades old and eerily
accurate:
As the present system cracks and the super-industrial revolution rolls
over us, as the armies of juvenile delinquents swell, as hundreds of
thousands of youngsters flee their homes, and students rampage at
universities in all the techno-societies, we can expect vociferous
demands for an end to parental dilettantism.23
As widely accepted among all professionals, the presence of one or
two chaotic parents fosters longer, more risky dissolution proceedings
and a greater potential for post-judgment conflict for children.24 The
conundrum for the courts is what to do with those private decision
makers (the lawful parents) who abdicate, by malfeasance or
nonfeasance, the privilege to exercise parental authority by engaging in
a level of chronic conflict that damages children from generation to
generation." This rather bleak picture is not helped by a court system
which is ill-equipped to perform such a function because it lacks the
resources and funding to be social service agency and its constitutional
and statutory traditions place ethical and legal limitations on its ability
to make judgments that micro-manage parents' lives.
22. In her recent book, Barbara Dafoe Whitehead reviews the change from an ethic
of duty to children to right to individual fulfillment irrespective of consequences. See
BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE 10- 11 (1997) ("To put it plainly,
many of the ideas we have come to believe and vigorously defend about adult
prerogatives and freedoms in family life are undermining the foundations of altruism
and support for children."). On the issue of this absence of a child-centered ethic and
the "contractual" approach to parental rights and responsibilities, she notes the erosion
by divorce of parental independence and child-centeredness when "the focus of
attention shifts to the quarreling between divorced parents." Id. at 166.
23. See TOFFLER, supra note 4, at 243.
24. See Janet R. Johnston, Building Multidisciplinary Professional Partnerships With
the Court on BehalfofHigh-Conflict Divorcing Families and Their Children: Who Needs What
Kind of Help?, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 451 (2000) ("The family environments
of chronic custody disputes are characterized by the parents' mutual distrust, fear,
anger, projection of blame onto the ex-partner, refusal to cooperate and communicate,
allegations of abuse, and sabotage of each other's parenting and time with the child.").
25. See II THE HANDBOOK OF FAMILY PSYCHOLOGY AND THERAPY 910-28 (Luciano
L'Abate ed., 1985). The notion of multi-generational patterns of child abuse is
somewhat controversial but even assessing factors like poverty and stress, it is difficult
not to accept the notion that "certain constellations of family and/or personality
variables" increases the probability of parenting failure. Id. See also Marjory D. Fields,
The Impact ofSpouse Abuse on Children and Its Relevance in Custody and Visitation Decisions
in New York State, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 221, 231 (1994) ("[t]he tendency of
child witnesses to model violent behavior is well established").
20001 535
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A fourth element for our Futurist arrives from the American Bar
Association's most recent efforts to alter the legal profession as a
profession by recommending the eradication of the rule that bars
lawyers and non-lawyers from splitting fees and practicing together.26
The rather unfulfilling debate concerning the "unauthorized practice of
law" in many states 27 is already a losing proposition even as the
floodgates open. If the American Bar Association becomes the Anyone
Bar Association, ethical dilemmas will be eliminated and lawyers will
not have to be licensed advocates. As Toffler intimated in the context
of technology, this "high velocity of change, 28 may be found in modem
courtrooms where domestic violence advocates, government social
workers, and others appear in "trial" roles and prosecute or assist pro se
litigants so as to balance, with some legitimacy given the history of
ignoring such power imbalances, the scales of advocacy. Justice will be
administered without the nuisance of advocacy by lawyers.29 When
these developments are complete, and the court system is a social
26. See John Gibeaut, Practice Debate Heats Up, 85 A.B.A. J. 14 (1999); James
Podgere, Ethics in 2000 and Beyond, 85 A.B.A. J. 96 (1999); Ronald A. Landen,
Comment, The Prospects ofthe Accountant-Lawyer Multidisciplinary Partnership in English-
Speaking Countries, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 763 (1999).
27. For purposes of consumer protection, the most difficult task confronting
legislatures and bar associations nationwide is defining non-lawyer practices and the
tiers of services that could be provided to consumers by non-lawyers without the risk
of unethical, negligent, or fraudulent representation. In several recent cases, courts
have defined the unauthorized practice of law within the boundary of the ethical and
legal duties of the professionally trained lawyer and the obligations of trust and
confidentiality owed the consumer. See Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Patton, 683
A.2d 1359, 1361 (Conn. 1996) (A business known as Doc-u-prep of New England was
practicing law. The practical approach is to consider each set of facts and determine
whether it falls within the fair intendment of the term that requires in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations: "It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions [of practicing law] be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill and of sound moral character, acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligation to clients which rests upon all attorneys."); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Hallmon, 681 A.2d 510, 514 (Md. 1996) ("This Court has always found it difficult to
craft an all encompassing definition of the practice of law," but the focus of the inquiry
should be "on whether the activity in question required legal knowledge and skill in
order to apply legal principles and precedent.").
28. TOFFLER, supra note 4, at 428. Despite ongoing government and corporate
efforts, the Internet and its world-wide capacity to share information (and much
misinformation) makes it doubtful that lawyers and judges can prevent the dilution of
the legal profession; especially if the guild decides to dismantle itself. See id..
29. A discussion of the traditional roles of lawyers, including contested litigation,
may be found in MITCHELL S. G. KLEIN, LAW, COURTS, AND POLICY 72-77 (1984).
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service agency, some assume that representation of clients at the
courthouse will fall to the more genteel tactics of non-lawyers. °
The fifth element challenges the traditional role of the guardian ad
litem when providing services to the court in private litigation. Over the
decades, states have permitted guardians ad litem in private custody
cases to be attorneys, therapists, or other professionals or volunteers,
with the duties ranging from advocates to investigators.3' Under the
court order appointing the guardian ad litem, she is empowered with the
right, obligation, and duty to make recommendations to the court
concerning the best interests of the children. 32 This delegation is for the
30. There are undoubtedly those within the legal profession who will argue that
this is a good thing and that lawyers simply clutter up the pristine delivery ofjustice at
the courthouse. This is not usually the view of trial judges who have to walk through
the morass of angry folks bounding into the courthouse for a solution to their family
conflicts. See Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling of Legal Services and the Family Lawyer, 28
FAM. L.Q. at 435 ("The legal and procedural barriers to pro se representation have been
compounded by attitudes of both bench and bar."). Appellate courts often write
opinions stating that pro se litigants are to be treated the same as a party represented
by a lawyer. See Richards v. Bruce, 691 A.2d 1223, 1225 (Me. 1997) ("We have long
recognized the principle that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as
represented litigants .... Neither civil nor criminal litigants are afforded any special
consideration because of their pro se status.").
31. In an important case, the Maine Supreme Court held that a guardian ad litem
who was sued was entitled to indemnification for attorneys' fees as a government
employee under Maine's Tort Claim Act. See Kennedy v. Maine, 730 A.2d 1252 (Me.
1999). An excellent summary of the historical role may be found in ANN M.
HARALAMBIE, THE CHILD'S ATTORNEY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CUSTODY,
ADOPTION, AND PROTECTIONCASES 1- 14 (1993). The skill to advocate for children is not
a function of a particular license or education though licensing is a legitimate check on
unethical behaviors and education is a legitimate tool for acquiring insight and
recognizing biases. See id.
32. Addressing the right to independent counsel, the court in Miller v. Miller, 677
A.2d 64 (Me. 1996), held that:
Although the law imposes procedural limitations on children, it does so to
protect their interests. In the realm of divorce and other family litigation,
this protective purpose finds expression in the best interests standard. In
Maine, as in the multitude of other states which have adopted the best
interest standard, courts faced with the task of rearranging parental rights and
responsibilities must strive for an outcome that will maximize the best
interest of children .... This standard protects children who lack the ability
because of youth, inexperience, and immaturity to protect themselves. The
protective purpose of this standard is also important in analyzing the
constitutional claim of the Miller children.
Miller, 677 A.2d at 68. As the court succinctly held:
[Elxclusion of children as parties in the divorce of their parents, and the
related possibility that there will be no forceful advocacy for the custodial
preference of the children, does not increase the risk of erroneous custody
determinations that disserve the best interest of children. The guardian ad
litem is already an advocate for the best interests of the children in all of its
2000] 537
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purpose of assisting the court to act in the best interests of the child as
a "wise, affectionate, and careful parent. 33  The trial court should
clearly define the duties of the guardian ad litem at the time of appoint-
ment so as to minimize confusion as to whether that duty is "pure
representation, pure investigation, or a combination."34  Once the
investigation is completed and the guardian ad litem issues her report,
a hearing is necessary because the trial court is entitled to accept or
reject the findings and conclusions after reviewing the qualifications,
intelligence, scope of investigation, and validity of the conclusions.35
complex dimensions. The narrow focus of an attorney for the children, who
would be obligated to carry out their preferences regardless of the wisdom
of such a course, might well increase the likelihood of a custody
determination that is not in the best interest of the children.
Id. at 70. Similarly, the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that:
Affording the minor children in a dissolution action an unrestricted right to
appeal orders regarding their support carries with it significant risks of
widening the fissures in an already sorely tried family, and of imposing
burdens on the non-custodial parent and the legal system that may well
outweigh the potential benefits .... Treating the children as parties might
well force them to choose sides and thus threaten to exacerbate their already
heavy emotional burden, and would add a level of participation--even if
only symbolic in most cases-that is inconsistent with a wise attempt to
shield them as much as reasonably possible from the legal aspects of their
parents' conflicts.
Newman v. Newman, 663 A.2d 980, 987 (Conn. 1995).
33. Cyr v. Cyr, 432 A.2d 793, 796 (Me. 1981) ("To choose the greater of two
goods is admittedly no easier than to identify the lesser of two evils.").
34. See, e.g., Leary v. Leary, 627 A.2d 30, 36-37 (Md. App. 1993).
35. See Doubleday v. Doubleday, 551 A.2d 525, 526-27 (N.H. 1988). In Van
Schaik v. Van Schaik, the child's counsel tried to delete sections of the report in order to
protect the child and yet testify to conclusions and recommendations at the hearing.
The court held (quite properly) that this was a violation of due process for the parent:
[T]hese reports consist largely of hearsay declarations-often double--or
triple-level hearsay-as well as opinions of various social workers, medical
or paramedical personnel, psychologists, teachers, and the like, which may
or may not have a reasonable basis. Statements contained in a custody
investigation report have no special indicia of reliability. They are generally
not under oath and often emanate from people having overt or covert bias.
In many instances, the statements represent subjective feelings and
perceptions rather than objective observations or empiric data. Their
usefulness to the court is only as strong as their reliability, and that requires
that they be subject to challenge in essentially the same manner as any other
critical evidence ..... "'Due process' encompasses that principle and
requires that if a court bases its custody decision, even in part, on an
independent report, the parties-or their attorneys-must be given the
opportunity to examine the report and must be allowed the opportunity to
cross-examine the investigator and to produce outside witnesses to establish
any inaccuracies the report may contain. However sensitive the material
may be, a party has a right to know what evidence is being considered by the
538 [Vol. 22
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Ignoring specific titles such as attorney ad litem36 or guardian ad litem,
judges appoint some form of representation (protection) for the child.
Because there is no other alternative to the parental choice of chaos,
attendant ethical dilemmas will yield to necessity."
What is our Futurist's conclusion from the mixture of these
elements when there is embattled chaos between parents? In the future,
titles and professions will not matter; only the status as a court ap-
pointed officer of the court. The guardian ad litem will act as an
investigator and prepare a report for the parents, the court, and her child-
client. If the parties cannot settle, the guardian ad litem, who is the
advocate for the child,38 will then serve as a referee whose job it is to
render binding decisionsfor the child in lieu of the parents 'decision making
court in judging his cause. A custody case can no more be tried and decided
upon secret ex parte evidence than any other proceeding."
603 A.2d 908, 914 (Md. App. 1992) (quoting Denningham v. Denningham, 431 A.2d
755 (Md. 1981)).
36. See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 663 A.2d 980 (Conn. 1995); Dawson v. Garcia,
666 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. App. 1989).
37. See Schult v. Schult, 699 A.2d 134 (Conn. 1997) (attorney for child may
advocate different position than that recommended by guardian ad litem). See generally
Bruce A. Green, Lawyers as Nonlawyers in Child-Custody and Visitation Cases: Questions
from the "Legal Ethics" Perspective, 73 IND. L.J. 665 (1998). A compendium of the
ethical standards as they now exist may be found in Representing Children: Standards for
Guardians Ad Litem in Custody and Visitation Proceedings, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. I
(1995); Proposed Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and
Neglect Cases, 29 FAM. L.Q. 375 (1995). "The purpose of appointing counsel for a
minor child in a dissolution action is to insure independent representation of the child's
interest and such representation must be entrusted to the professional judgment of
appointed counsel within the usual constraints applicable to such representation."
Knock v. Knock, 621 A.2d 267, 275-76 (Conn. 1993). For an applicable discussion,
see Steven H. Hobbs, Family Matters: Nonwaivable Conflicts of Interest in Family Law, 22
SEATTLE U. L. REv. 57 (1998). For another view, see Martin Guggenheim, Reconsidering
the Need for Counsel for Children in Custody, Visitation and Child Protection Proceedings,
29 LoY. U. Cri. L.J. 299 (1998).
38. See Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676 (Conn. 1998). Here, the Connecticut
Supreme Court emphasized that the child's attorney is an attorney, advocating on
behalf of a client; and is not to be a witness. See id. at 688. Justice Katz concluded by
stating:
An attorney for the child should not express to the court, in advance of trial,
his or her opinion as to the best interests of the child, particularly when that
opinion is at the heart of the ultimate issue in the case. An attorney for the
child should participate in legal proceedings by submitting trial briefs,
questioning witnesses, giving oral argument, and, generally, by functioning
in a manner similar to an attorney for an unimpaired adult. The proper





authority.39 The guardian ad litem's duty will run to the court and the
needs of the child and the court will define the scope of the duties based
upon a factual matrix necessitated by the scope of the parental
(mis)conduct.4" In those circumstances when there is a possibility of a
parental learning curve that indicates a potential to modify behavior
necessary to protect the child, then that is all for the better. In circum-
stances when that capacity is minimal then the parents decision making
authority will be curbed or abrogated.4 Although each parent may have
a constitutional and statutory right toparticipate in raising their children,
biology does not create a circumstance in which a right to adult conflict
is a moral imperative that debases the rights of the child.42 The new
millennium's guardian ad litem will
wear both the role of moral agent for the family and the robe ofjudicial
authority, and in those roles will constitute the font of decision making
for this group of parents. Thus, the evolution of the guardian ad litem's
duty will be from investigator to champion to referee. It is the role of
39. At least one author might find our Futurist misguided. See Raven C. Lidman,
The Guardian Ad Litem in Child Custody Cases: The Contours of Our Judicial System
Stretched Beyond Recognition, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 255 (1998).
40. See Gerber v. Peters, 584 A.2d 605, 607 (Me. 1990).
41. For an analysis of this argument, see Roy T. Stuckey, Guardians Ad Litem as
Surrogate Parents: Implicationsfor Role Definition and Confidentiality, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
1785 (1986). A guardian is:
a person lawfully invested with the power, and charged with the duty of
taking care of the person and managing the property and rights of another
person, who, for defect of age, understanding, or self-control, is considered
incapable of administering his own affairs .... A guardian ad litem is a
special guardian appointed by the court in which a particular litigation is
pending to represent an infant, ward or unborn person in that particular
litigation, and the status of guardian ad litem exists only in that specific
litigation in which the appointment occurs.
Id. at 1785 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 706 (6th ed. 1990)).
42. Interesting arguments that track this analysis may be found in Hildy Mauzerall
et al., Protecting the Children of High Conflict Divorce: An Analysis of the Idaho Bench/Bar
Committee to Protect Children of High Conflict Divorce's Report to the Idaho Supreme Court,
33 IDAHO L. REV. 291 (1997) (evaluating child psychology and child development
research and recommends protocol forjudges, which includes providingjudges access
to mental health professionals, training judges, parents, and family law practitioners in
fundamentals of child development, guidelines for determining custody and visitation
in violent parent cases); James A. Twaite & Anya K. Luchow, Custodial Arrangements
and Parental Conflict Following Divorce: The Impact on Children's Adjustment, 24 J.
PSYCHIATRY& L. 53 (1996) (research regarding impact of various post-divorce custodial
arrangements on children and concludes that level of parental conflict rather than
custodial arrangement is more significant factor).
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referee, however, that will fundamentally alter the landscape of the
judicial system's response to the embattled family system.43
I. WHAT IF THE FUTURIST IS WRONG?
It is best to begin with self-criticism so that the flaws in our
Futurist's reasoning are exposed early. An evolving body of literature
by feminist scholars concerning post-modernism and deconstruction"
as it relates to history, philosophy, religion, and especially law (as
defined by the making of judgments within the judicial system), leads
to the uncomfortable notion that my arguments are built on fallacies as
a function of my ignorance of that field of study. I am also troubled by
a category of study that may make these predictions stereotypical, or
stated another way, ignores a method of examining family decision
making structures and traditions that are unrepresentative of a large (and
growing) portion of American society." My recent readings have
created a rumbling dissonance with the positions I have advocated in the
past concerning methods for protecting the rights of children, including
the role of the guardian ad litem as advocate. More annoying, the
criteria for identifying cases that require judicial triage may be accurate
but the solution, always in the nature of the exercise of power dominated
by "patriarchal thought"' may miss something more fundamental or
unique as a means of protecting children."7
43. But see In re Marriage of Lloyd, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 37 (Cal. App. 1997) (holding
that the court lacked authority to appoint guardian ad litem to represent children in
hearings and to make orders in post-dissolution proceeding to modify custody absent
parties' consent to reference).
44. 1 profess no expertise concerning the writings of Michael Foucault but his
work does seem to merge the issue for debate. See Lois MCNAY, FOUCAULT FEMINISM
I (1992) ("Firstly, where does the poststructuralist deconstruction of unified
subjectivity into fragmented subject positions lead in terms of an understanding of
individuals as active agents capable of intervening in and transforming their social
environment?"). For a more detailed discussion, see id. at 118-26.
45. Sensitive discussions may be found in Cynthia R. Mabry, African Americans
"'Are Not Carbon Copies" of White Americans-The Role of African American Culture in
Mediation of Family Disputes, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 405 (1998); Larry Cata
Backer, Culturally Significant Speech: Law, Courts, Society, and Racial Equity, 21 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 845 (1999).
46. See WINDERS, supra note 17, at 146.
47. There are many available articles and books on family law in particular, but
at the risk of selective citation, I will acknowledge a few that have influenced this
article. See Nancy A. Weston, The Fate. Violence, and Rhetoric of Contemporary Legal
Thought: Reflections on the Amherst Series, the Loss of Truth, and Law, 22 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY. 733 (1997); Linda G. Mills, On the Other Side of Silence: Affective Lawyeringfor
Intimate Abuse, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1225 (1996); Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women,
UALR LAW REVIEW
Family dislocation and its management may be a function of some
dialectic more comprehensive and insightful than has been written. My
concern is that the traditional view of litigation and the role of guardians
ad litem in the context of high conflict cases may be read solely in the
masculine context of conflict and its form of resolution." Thus, as our
Futurist constructs a judicial system for children, there is a place for
criticism of a binary logic of individual/society, inside/outside and the
impact (not just on Marxist theory) of the relationship between the
judicial system and "public/private dichotomies that provide the focus
of much recent feminist social theory."49
A second area of concern that coexists with feminist critical theory
is that the aura of science has permeated the judicial system, and has
inevitably influenced the role of the guardian ad litem in private custody
cases. The United States Supreme Court has struggled with the
admissibility of expert testimony at trial in Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.5" and Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael.5 In both
cases, the issue is what constitutes an expert witness and then what
constitutes science (or what constitutes science and then what consti-
tutes an expert witness though two different things). With this
"gatekeeping role," trial judges now must assess the methodology and
reliability of expert witnesses by first determining if it is science that the
law will recognize.
In family law, the difficulties are not so much with medical
testimony but the behavioral science professions and the relationship
between such a "science," and its relevancy to the best interests of
82 CAL. L. REV.I (1994).
48. A favorite example concerns the relationship between judges in appellate
courts:
[a] Justice who is willing to make all the modifications suggested by his.
colleagues is liable to find he has fathered an amorphous mass of doughy
sentences rather than a strong statement of law. Holmes once complained
to Sir Frederick Pollack about his fellow Justices, that "the boys generally
cut one of the genitals" out of opinions he circulated.
WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 24 (1964).
49. WINDERS, supra note 17, at 68. See also KAREN GREEN, THE WOMAN OF REASON:
FEMINISM, HUMANISM AND POLITICALTHOUGHT 107-08 (1995) (discussing the relationship
of Marx and Freud); Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475
(1999) ("Feminism's principal contribution to the law ofthe family in the United States
has been to open up that institution to lateral scrutiny and question thejustice of a legal
regime that has permitted, even reinforced, the subordination of some family members
to others.").
50. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
51. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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children and custody decision making.5 - Whatever the profession of the
guardian ad litem, when a final opinion of outcome is to be given based
upon behavioral sciences, recent literature notes the absence of
"empirical research performed to guide mental health professionals in
the evaluation process":
Common sense demands judicial scrutiny of all experts' professional
status and expertise. Whether assessing the admissibility or the
weight of a mental health professional's proffered expert testimony
about the best interests of the child or any other expert testimony, it
is sensible to consider conjunctively both the qualifications of the
expert and the validity of the methods and procedures underlying the
expert's opinions. Standing alone, neither assures that the resulting
testimony is worthy of belief."3
Behavioral or human sciences may provide data and context for
behaviors and family patterns that may assist entry of an appropriate and
ethical judgment in a family case.54 Science in the form of psychoanaly
52. Dr. Halon's paper on this topic is a fair and concise statement of this
conundrum and its consequences. See Robert L. Halon, The Comprehensive ChildCustody
Evaluation-Ten Years Later, 22 U. ARK. LrITLE ROCK L. REV. 479 (2000) ("Deciding or
establishing value is precisely what science and medicine do not do. Science and
medicine speak of'significance' (comparisons), not of 'importance' (norms, value),.
• . the closer the mental health evaluators' premises and conclusions are to reflections
of value, the easier and more appropriate it is for others to take rightful issue with their
so-called 'expert opinions."').
53. Daniel W. Shuman, What Should We Permit Mental Health Professionals to Say
About "The Best Interests of the Child"?: An Essay on Common Sense, Daubert. and the Rules
of Evidence, 31 FAM. L.Q. 551, 552 (1997). The increase in custody litigation has
created an increase in lawsuits that have evolved a body of immunity law. See, e.g.,
Chambers v. Stem, 338 Ark. 332, 994 S.W.2d 463 (1999) (holding that a therapist
appointed by a court to evaluate and provide treatment to a family during a custody
case may be liable for malpractice if he operates outside the scope of a court's order);
Fleming v. Asbill, 483 S.E.2d 751 (S.C. 1997) (holding that guardian ad litem in
private custody proceeding is not acting on behalf of the court and is therefore not a
state employee entitled to governmental immunity but is entitled to common law
immunity for acts performed within the scope of the appointment to protect the
guardian from disgruntled parents), Delcourt v. Silverman, 919 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.
1996) (psychologist and guardian ad litem is integral part of the judicial system and
entitled to absolute judicial immunity for acts performed within the bounds of the court
appointment); Berndt v. Molepske, 565 N.W.2d 549 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (guardian
ad litem is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity as acts are intimately tied to the judicial
process). See generally Holly Marie McIntyre, Note, Fleming v. Asbill, South Carolina
Guardian Ad Litem not Immune from Civil Liability, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1711 (1996).
54. See Marc J. Ackerman & Melissa C. Ackerman, Child Custody Evaluation
Practices: A 1996Survey of Psychologists, 30 FAM. L.Q. 565 (1996). The authors note the
development of ethical guidelines for the conduct of child custody evaluations. See
American Psychological Association, Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluation in Divorce
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sis or psychology as a"field" is "thoroughly interdisciplinary, regardless
of territorial imperatives of either psychology or psychiatry, which latter
institution has kept psychoanalysis well domesticated in the United
States."" The mental health opinion, by statute or common law, is not
necessary to the fact-finding itself. Instead, it serves a psychological (or
perception) purpose for the public and parents because, as often happens
in the crucible of the courtroom, a judge's judgment is "legal" but a
psychologist's opinion is scientific-even if the words are identical.
The science of human behavior is intended to study and analyze patterns
that may allow prediction of future conduct. But the value decision, as
to the importance of each fact within that pattern then applied to the best
interests of a child, is laden with the law because the law must enforce
and sanction the behavior it orders.
In this sense, I am struck with the possibility that the conventions
that govern our interpretation of science and the law, and the mixed role
of guardians ad litem who recommend or renderjudgments based upon
facts as applied to the "science of behavior," may miss an opportunity
to expand and open the historical and intellectual analysis from a male-
centered dialectic of conflict resolution/advocacy to a broader paradigm.
For lack of a more creative solution (and more knowledge on my part),
however, the Futurist ducks discovery of the answer to this brief foray
and examines more conventional future shock unblemished by intellec-
tual dissonance.
III. THE FUTURIST Is RIGHT-THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM AS REFEREE
The future role of the guardian ad litem as the empowered decision
maker must be understood in the context of current traditions ofjudicial
decision making in family law matters.56 The most significant obliga-
tion facing the legal system at the turn of the century is the preservation
of this current generation of children in the context (and chaos) of a
parental choice to cause litigation. Whether a child protective proceed-
ing, protection from abuse or harassment action, or divorce or unmarried
allocation of parental rights and responsibilities, the obligation to render
Proceedings, 49 AM. PSYCHOL. 677 (1994); Association of Family and Conciliation
Courts, Model Standards ofPractice for Child Custody Evaluations, 32 FAM. & CONCILIATION
CTS. REV. 504 (1994).
55. WINDERS, supra note 17, at 97. See generally EVELYN FOX KELLER, REFLECTIONS
ON GENDER IN SCIENCE (1985).
56. A truncated version of Part III appears in Dana E. Prescott, Parental Conflict and
the Appointment of Referees in Child Custody Cases, 15 ME. BAR J.44 (2000).
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ajudgment concerning children is placed before ajudge. The preserva-
tion of this category of children by the judicial system presents the
troubling, and often irreconcilable, process of identifying the parent who
has a capacity to acquire and maintain parenting skills within a referent
time frame and imposition of a consequence that is protective of the best
interests of children when such skills are lacking.
There is no "science" that can provide an answer for judges. The
process ofjudging will always be one of personal character and honor,
common sense and intuition, and statutory pronouncements framed by
constitutional duty." Even ifjudges accept that there is a science for the
interpretation of human behavior at the particular moment of observa-
tion, there is yet no science of human behavior that can predict future
behavior toward children. At best, past behavior (historical facts)
disclose a range of possible future paths from which ajudge selects the
more probable outcome.5" This leaves the "Law", in the guise of a
judge, to make a "judgment" (legal determination) as to the "best
interests of a child" based upon selective historical events proffered
through the perception of parents feuding in court.
In every state, such a judgment requires an allocation of parental
rights and responsibilities defined by a litany of factors common to most
jurisdictions: age, intellectual talents or special needs of a child,
duration and adequacy of parenting arrangements, stability of future
living arrangements, a child's adjustment to home, school, and
community, and the existence of domestic violence.59 Applying these
factors as imposed by common law or legislature, a judge assesses the
facts and renders ajudgment in the form of a court order. Traditionally,
however, there is no mechanism, in actions involving private parties, for
57. Among the most famous descriptions of this process is BENJAMINN. CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921), which remains a worthwhile read because
it frames the contours for an understanding of the exercise of judicial authority.
58. This statement greatly oversimplifies a fundamental debate "about whether
man should be studied in the same way as other natural phenomena-whether, in short,
history is a science." JOHN TosH, THE PURSUIT OF HISTORY: AIMS, METHODS, AND NEW
DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF MODERN HISTORY 109 (1984). The scholarly development
of history as a science, however, has application to the manner in which future courts
will need to correlate data ("factual knowledge") about family systems: "In Karl
Popper's influential view, scientific knowledge consists not of laws but the best
available hypotheses; it is provisional rather than certain knowledge." Id. at 115. The
same, I believe, is true about the judicial response to family chaos and conflict.
59. The list of factors that eventually became Maine's definition of best interests
under Maine Revised Statutes Annotated is common to many states. See ME. REV.




ongoing observation and decision making to secure the best interests of
a child when a judge determines that the parents are collectively
incapable (intellectually, emotionally, psychologically) of parenting.'
The imposition of governmental supervision over private parenting
decisions after entry of a judgment raises the legitimate specter of a
potential abuse of power to the detriment children and parental
authority. Nevertheless, when the judicial authority to allocate rights
and responsibilities is invoked by feuding parents, the court must
impose an ongoing and enforceable standard of parental responsibility
because the state (government) is acting as an arbiter (parenspatriae) for
children. The recurring danger to children over the past few decades is
the mantra that any parent is curable of any irrational or
characterological impairments. Upon the invocation of a parental
choice to litigate, a finding of the inability to provide safe and stable
care for a child should not be rewarded by an absence of legal account-
ability.6 The conundrum known to any judge is that a judgment in
equity that maintains and orders existing relationships, whether business
injunctions or parental rights orders, is futile without the capacity to
enforce that judgment.62 The repeatedly recalcitrant will defy any
remedy that is not swift of consequence.
Parental rights and responsibilities determinations are serious
enough to afford an opportunity to be a successful parent. But if
education or time cannot graft conscience or character then a child's
right to security must be given legal primacy when parents select the
court to make such ajudgment. If chronic conflict between parents, or
the ongoing emotional or psychological disability of a parent, is a
60. In child protective proceedings brought by the state, the court must hold a
judicial review until termination of parental rights occurs. See, e.g., In re Alexander D.,
716 A.2d 222 (Me. 1998).
61. The distinction between the role ofscience in determining legal culpability and
the law's invocation of punishment irrespective of "mental soundness" has a long
history. See R. ROGER SMITH, TRIAL BY MEDICINE: INSANITY AND RESPONSIBILITY IN
VICTORIAN TRIALS, ch. 4 (1981).
Medicine says a man may be insane and irresponsible, and yet know right
and wrong; law says a knowledge of right and wrong is the test of both
soundness of mind and responsibility to the law. Medicine says, restrain and
cure the insane and imbecile offender against the law; law says, hang,
imprison, whip, hunger him, and treats medical art with contempt ....
Id. at 106 (quoting T. Laycock, On Law and Medicine in Insanity: An Introductory Lecture,
7 EDINBURGH MED. J. 1132 (1862)).
62. As Justice Holmes commented: "In determining whether a court ofequity can
take jurisdiction, one of the first questions is what it can do to enforce any order that
it may make." Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475,487 (1903). For a valuable discussion of
judicial power and strategy for decision making see MuRPHY, supra note 45.
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function of behaviors that are incurable within a period of time defined
by the ability of the child to survive that conflict, how is the court to
impose ajudgment concerning "best interests" that fulfills its duty to the
child if the court finds that the parents' behaviors are, more probably
than not, going to continue? It is again important to expose and reject
the giddy optimism of the modem false science63 that requires the
judiciary to act as a cuckold for a mixture of law and science that
assumes that if anything positive can occur, given an infinite range of
possibilities, only the most overt cruelty warrants the loss of parental
rights and responsibilities.
Post-conception responsibility for parental chaos, and its affect
upon the best interests of a child, requires development of a paradigm
that allows the court to frame a judgment by applying legal factors
common to every case but flexible enough to consider the unique factual
variables of each family pattern. There are two specific features that are
linked: level of parental achievement (L) and time (Tx).' "L" is
defined by the list of best interests factors applied by courts to the facts.
A judge must evaluate "Tx" on a case-by-case basis because parents
enter the judicial system at various stages of stress, chaos, and
characterological disorders. "P" is defined as the point when "L" and
"Tx" intersect. Each curve on the graph can then be defined by the
coordinates of"L" and "Tx" and the resulting categories of"Flatliners,"
"Tweeners," "Advanced Learning Curvers," and "Learners."65
For"Flatliners," (Category A), hopelessness is a prevailing concept
irrespective of Tx. Not everyone can be rescued within the childhood
of a child. The capacity of a child to be healthy is a closed period of a
few years when the incentive to work, the moral spirit to connect with
the community, and the desire for intellectual and vocational achieve-
ment can be instilled. Flatliners will essentially fail even the lowest
rung: a lack of empathy for the child's pain or discomfort, whether
63. These elements of "science" are discussed in DANA E. PREscOTr, THE HYDRA
HYPOTHESIS: THE MINEFIELD OF ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE, CHRONIC INTERFERENCE, AND THE
NEEDS OF CHILDREN (1997). My use of features, some to point out the absurdity of
oversimplification (such as "mother-dominated" for those falsely accused of abuse)
argues for an outcome-based analysis of children's needs within the judicial system.
In time, the term "hypothesis" (or "syndrome" for that matter) is probably better
replaced by the term "paradigm" when describing the judicial process.
64. See Appendix I.
65. These terms are not mine. Several years ago at a Resources for Divorced
Families retreat in Bethel, Maine, a speaker used these phrases and the terms stuck with
me. I cannot, however, attribute the phrases to any individual after this many years.
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emotional, physical or psychological, and chronic lifestyle disarray
often coupled with substance abuse.
Category B are the "Tweeners:" the parents whose capacity to
learn (L) reflects incremental improvements in parenting skills
(cooperation, responsibility, safety, non-violence) if and when there is
the spotlight of supervision or sanction. This parent may not improve
for a sustained period of time (i.e., irrespective of Tx) but may regress
to Flatliner status once the spotlight or spigot of resources is turned off.
The dilemma is whether the community is willing to donate sufficient
resources because this parent is salvageable only with ongoing supervi-
sion.
Category C is the "Advanced Learning Curver." This parent learns
faster than Category B but the potential for a flatlining fallback is less.
For example, work ethic, counseling, and voluntary participation in
mediation or parenting workshops may indicate an objective capacity to
alter past behaviors and to sustain that improvement over time.
Category D are the "Learners:" the parent who often finds him or
herself with little confidence or role models but possesses the integrity
and insight sufficient to subsume selfish needs, withdraw from personal
combat that imperils a child, and seek educational and therapeutic
resources. These parents are educable; knowledge will matter; their
lives will adapt and organize and, thereby, hold the potential to dissolve
turbulence.
This paradigm provides a very limited framework for plotting the
most complex of human relationships. There is no parental perfection.
It is the willingness to learn and adapt, applied to time in the context of
a child's needs and welfare, that defines success for a parent-child
relationship in any category. Science cannot predict the impact of
trauma or behavioral changes, or the sheer chance that random mole-
cules of the mind will coalesce into parenting skills without the benefit
of a hospitable environment.' There is always the chance that a
Flatliner can get it right: much like there is always a chance that a rabbit
typing on a keyboard will produce Judge Frank's Law and The Modern
Mind. The most subjective and fungible variable is "Time"-which is
a euphemism for opportunity. In a private custody case, how long is a
66. The nature versus nurture debate has a raft of literature. Clarence Darrow
argued decades ago that "[e]ndless discussions have been devoted to the relative
importance of heredity and environment in human conduct. This is a fruitless task. In
a sense, each one is of supreme importance in the outcome of a life." CLARENCE
DARRow, CRIME: ITS CAUSE AND TREATMENT 38-39 (1922).
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parent willing to put a child at risk for his or her own self-interest?67
How long will it take a parent to resolve conflicts or overcome a
psychological or characterological disorder? Any paradigm may
oversimplify the answer to these questions because a parent may shed
characteristics of selfishness and rage that harm children and substitute
the qualities of empathy and self-awareness that give a child a chance
of future success. Parental choice, however, inevitably leads to a higher
potential for children with psychological, intellectual, and moral
dysfunctions to the detriment of themselves and the community.
Everything about the allocation of parental rights and responsibili-
ties within thejudicial system is about the process of merging hundreds
of available facts against the stitching of the law to yield such a
judgment.68 What professionals do know is that children cannot survive
an onslaught that is perpetual. The military learned long ago that adults
can only survive the mental stress of combat for a few months at a time.
Yet in custody cases children, not adults, are required to delay or defer
the possibility of a healthy childhood for years on the hope that one or
both parents are educable.
67. [ profess no expertise in the mathematics of game theory, but it is another field
of study that may have application to the assessment of individuals within a family
system. See JOHN C. HARSANYI, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING EQUILIBRIUM IN
GAMES AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS 10 (1977):
In contrast to individual decision theory, both game theory and ethics deal
with rational behavior in a social setting. But game theory deals with
individuals who rationally pursue their own self-interest (as well as all
values, both selfish and unselfish, to which their own utility function assigns
positive utility) against other individuals who just as rationally pursue their
own self-interest (as well as all their other values included in their own
utility functions).
Id.
68. Parents do not lose responsibility for their children by the filing of a divorce
action, but choices may abdicate that responsibility to the court. The problem is that
there is a sizable portion of the population that can only privately order their rights with
the threat of consequences, i.e., litigation. If you remove those consequences you will
find the meaning of real chaos for children. But for state intervention these parents
would exercise the "traditional authority" to abuse and neglect children. See Howard
A.Davidson, Child Protection Policy and Practice at Century's End, 33 FAM. L.Q. 765
(1999) (reviewing the state of the federal child protection laws). Anyway, divorce is
only a small part of family law conflict today as described by Professor Glendon in her
seminal work THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE
UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989). For a couple of interesting articles on this
topic, see Barbara Holland, The Long Good-Bye: In Which It Is Argued That a Look at the
History of Divorce May Make You Feel Better About Our Own Scandalous Ways,
SMITHSONIAN, Mar. 1, 1998, at 87; Francine Russo, Can the Government Prevent Divorce?,
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1997, at 28.
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For the judicial system, the management of parental chaos collides
with what Judge Jerome Frank in his seminal work, Law and The Modern
Mind, describes as the "childish desire"69 to find the "Infallible Judge,
the Maker of definite rules of conduct. He knows precisely what is right
and what is wrong and, as head of the family, sits in judgment and
punishes misdeeds."7 This "childish longing is an important element
in the explanation of the absurdly unrealistic notion that law is, or can
be made, entirely certain and definitely predictable."'" To reduce the
myth that there is judge-made process that can provide a cure for
parental chaos, the legal system must abandon the conspiracy of "stork-
fibs about how law is born and cease even hinting that perhaps there is
some truth in Peter Pan legends of ajuristic happy hunting ground in a
land of legal absolutes. 72
An excellent example of parental chaos, and the parameters of
judicial discretion to resolve parental disputes about children, may be
found in Rodrigue v. Brewer.73 In Rodrigue, two parents: (1) had a baby
after a brief "courtship" and marriage,74 (2) could not "separate
themselves from their marital conflicts, '75 (3) decided to separate, with
one parent in Quebec City, Quebec and the other in Belfast, Maine,76
and (4) were still found by the testimony of professionals to be "caring,
loving, and capable people who desire to parent" but "the intense
conflict between them substantially impairs their ability to cooperate in
that parenting.,' 77 It is this type of excuse-making for parents that makes
69. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 19 (1930).
70. Id. Judge Frank was writing in the early stages of the development of child
psychology so his Father-Judge metaphor is out-dated and oversimplified.
Nevertheless, his argument that there is a paradox when demanding more "cosmic
certainty" from law than biology, is still a fair analysis of this "childish" quest for an
omnipotent ruler over chaos. Id. at 14-23.
71. Id. at 18.
72. This Peter Pan metaphor extends, most dangerously, to those who search, in
the name of efficiency and statistical joy, for a mechanism that will remove family
chaos from the courts without any other alternative for protecting children. There is a
public relations advantage to this tactic because lawyers are an easy target for blame
but it is sadly lacking in the mature judgment of professionals who should know better.
A famous physicist reflecting on his childhood was reminded by his mother (a lawyer
in post-World War I England) of a quotation from the play The Self-Tormentor by the
African Slave Terintius: "'Homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto'. 'l am human and
I let nothing human be alien to me."' FREEMAN DYSON, DISTURBING THE UNIVERSE 15
(1979).
73. 667 A.2d 605 (Me. 1995).
74. See id. at 606.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 607.
77. Id.
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it easy for judges to disregard conclusions by other professions.
Shoving aside the bunk that these are "caring and loving" parents is easy
enough. There is no historical fact, described within the Rodrigue
decision, that shows any parental capacity in the future to separate selfish
needs from the child's right to be free from conflict.
The majority affirmed the trial court's allocation of parental rights
and responsibilities on an alternating four week schedule. Justice
Rudman's dissent superbly captures the essence of the boundaries for
judicial discretion in child custody cases. Justice Rudman began with
the premise that in the words of Justice Cardozo the court is not a "mere
arbiter between two adult adversaries, simply reacting to the evidence
that they may see fit to adduce in support of their respective positions."7
This means that even if the trial court has authority to impose a
judgment, the exercise of discretion is not proper if there is no eviden-
tiary basis for doing so or thejudgment is contrary to the evidence. The
only evidence common to all the expert witnesses in Rodrigue was that
the parents' behavior during the divorce proved, more probably than
not, that there would be no cooperation in the future. One of the
psychologists is cited as having actually asserted that there "must be no
shared responsibility, she said, but neither should either parent be given
'most' authority."'79
Neatly fitting within the topic of this paper, however, an expert in
Rodrigue suggested that in the short run the ultimate parenting power
should not reside with either parent but with a "guardianship of some
sort or some third party.""° One parent actually appealed the denial of
that suggestion, to which the Court held that: "[e]ven assuming that the
court had the authority to suspend parental rights,8' neither parent was
economically able to afford the services of a 'third parent."'82
Ordinarily, a trial court cannot micro-manage the future decision
making process in the absence of jeopardy. For example, the mere
allocation in Rodrigue by the trial court of authority to decide education
to one parent and religious decisions to the other parent does little to
resolve the conflict. Allocation of a power to one parent is not
78. Id. at 608 (Rudman, J., dissenting) (quoting Ziehm v. Ziehm, 433 A.2d 725,
728 (1981)).
79. See Rodrigue, 667 A.2d at 610 (Rudman, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 607.
81. Maine Revised Statutes Annotated title 19, section 752(6) is now Maine
Revised Statutes Annotated title 19-A, section 953(2)(C). The statute grants the trial
court authority to award custody to a third party when there is jeopardy. See ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 953(2)(c) (West 1999).
82. See Rodrigue, 667 A.2d at 607.
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concomitant with a termination of the power to object to the other
parent. Such an allocation may create a presumption of authority and
shift the burden to the parent without the power to prove an abuse of
that authority but it is not an absolute grant of authority to act unreason-
ably or in the extreme. As Justice Rudman concluded: "The court's
strain to effect a kind of legal equipoise is palpable,"83 but by such a
judgment the parents "who universally have been determined to be
incapable of resolving their conflicts" are impelled "into certain
conflict.""
The question presented, therefore, is what remedies are appropri-
ately available, within constitutional proscriptions, for the preservation
of the needs of the best interests of children when parents are "impelled"
into certain and chronic conflict and the delay and expense of litigation
is potentially harmful to a child? The practical answer to this question
is that the guardian ad litem may be an unnecessary middle step for
managing these families. The legal answer to this question depends
upon the extent to which a legislature may delegate to the judiciary, as
a co-equal branch of government, the authority to appoint a non-
constitutional judicial officer to exercise judicial authority to order
parental rights and responsibilities. 5
IV. GUARDIAN AD LITEM AS A REFEREE IN CHRONIC CONFLICT CASES:
WHEN AND How?
In 1995, the Maine Legislature adopted Maine Revised Statutes
Annotated, title 19-A, section 252, which represents a fairly simple
statutory means for conferring express authority upon a court to appoint
a referee in family law matters:
1. Appointment of Referee. The court may appoint a referee in any
proceeding for paternity, divorce, judicial separation or modifi-
cation of existing judgments brought under this Title:
83. Id. at 610 (Rudman, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 610-11 (Rudman, J., dissenting).
85. See Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
the court's delegation of authority must be grounded in statutory and constitutional
authority); Baril v. Baril, 354 A.2d 392, 395 (Me. 1976) ("it is well settled in Maine
that the jurisdiction and authority of the divorce court in matters of divorce and
incidental relief such as orders for custody, support and counsel fees, are exclusively
derived from the provisions of the statute. Jurisdiction over divorce is purely statutory
and every power exercised by the court with reference to it must be found in the
statutes or it does not exist.").
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A. When the parties agree the case may be tried before a referee;
or
B. Upon motion demonstrating exceptional circumstances that
require a referee.
2. Payment for Service. Payment for the services of the referees is the
responsibility of the parties, as ordered by the court. Ifthe court finds
that either or both of the parties are indigent, the court may pay the
reasonable costs and expenses of the referee.
3. Referee's report. If all parties waive the right to object to acceptance
of the referee's report, the court shall immediately enterjudgment on
the referee's report without a further hearing.
8 6
The enactment of section 252 is similar to efforts in many other
states to provide flexible alternative methods of dispute resolution for
families.8 7 Under section 252(1), the court may refer interim issues, or
a piece of an entire case, with the trial court reserving jurisdiction over
the remainder of the case. In some states, however, there are strict
limitations on the authority to refer matters related to the custody of
children.8" The consensual use of a referee/arbitrator is self-explanatory.
There have already been various experiments of this kind in Maine and
elsewhere employing lawyers and other professionals as referees to
allocate parental rights and responsibilities.89 If, however, one or both
86. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 252 (West 1999).
87. For example, Wisconsin allows parties to choose a variety ofcreative methods
of ADR, from mediation to arbitration. See WIS. STAT. § 802.12 (1999). The preference
for mediation as a means for "[miutually agreed solutions, rather than the public
acrimony of an adversarial legal proceeding, are viewed as less destructive to family
relationships, particularly parent-child ties." Mary Pat Treuthart, In Harm's Way?
Family Mediation and the Role of the Attorney Advocate, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 717
(1993). With the positive endorsement of the courts and lawyers, use of dispute
resolution techniques other than trial will continue to grow. See DONALD G. GIFFORD,
LEGAL NEGOTIATIONS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 201-19 (1989).
88. See Van Dine v. Gyuriska, 713 A.2d 1104, 1105 (Pa. 1998) (holding that the
father was entitled to de novo hearing before judge on custody as civil procedure rule
did not allow appointment of master to hear final custody case but only partial custody
or visitation); Bell v. Bell, 307 So. 2d 911 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that the
court had no authority to refer custody matter).
89. Even when parties consent to custody arbitration, appellate courts in other
states have struggled to encourage the parental choice to arbitrate as against the court's
traditional responsibility to protect the best interests of children. See, e.g., Dick v. Dick,
534 N.W. 2d 185 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that an arbitration decision regarding
child custody may not be overturned without fraud, duress or procedural defect);
M.F.M. v. J.O.M., 889 S.W.2d 944 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that only ajudge may
hear issues regarding child custody); Glauber v. Glauber, 192 A.D.2d 94 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1993) (holding that child custody arbitration agreements should not be enforced).
See generally Christine Albano, Comment, Binding Arbitration: A Proper Forum for Child
Custody, 14 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 419 (1997).
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parties refuse to consent, the court may still appoint a referee upon a
finding of "exceptional circumstances." Although without definition in
the statute, the term "exceptional circumstances" probably requires
technical, complex, and difficult factual or legal issues."
It is the nexus between the best interests of children and the
inability of parents to separate themselves from conflict that provides
the technical, complex, and difficult circumstances for appointment of
a guardian ad litem as a referee in family law matters. The flexibility to
appoint professionals with special expertise to conduct trials regarding
parental rights and responsibilities may be defined by a cluster of events
commonly seen in family law litigation:
1. The need for ongoing and swift supervision and decision making
when the conflict is escalating or continuous.9
2. Stability for the school year is at risk because of the filing of a late
motion or a lack of available trial time.
3. Modification of an existing order to protect a child from a residence
that is harmful. 92
4. Relocation cases in which the move (or moves) are without
adequate notice and opportunity for study or court hearings.
5. The child has an independent right to a hearing on a unique
medical, educational, or psychological issue.93
There is valid hesitation concerning the broad use of referees if only
because private judging could subsume the constitutional and statutory
responsibility of appointed judges. The statutory authority to appoint
a referee is, however, qualitatively different than the creation of a court-
system-within-a-court-system. The referee is a case specific exercise of
90. See, e.g., Carlson v. Carlson, 497 P.2d 1006 (Colo. 1972) ("[Mjasters should
not be appointed as a routine matter in divorce cases where the issues are not complex
and the facts are not complicated.").
91. See M.F.M., 889 S.W.2d at 950-51. (finding it was error to refer father's
motion to modify custody to master where exceptional condition alleged was calendar
congestion but refusal to reverse because parties in turmoil for two years).
92. Cf Mary D. v Watt, 438 S.E.2d 521, 525-26 (W.Va. 1992) (finding grounds
for "expeditious hearing" and referral to family law master may include allegations of
sexual abuse).
93. Parental authority to make medial decisions for children, particularly given the
propensity of modem parents to give legal but toxic drugs to their children to control
behavior, raises profound questions about a child's right to privacy. Although such
medical care is truly necessary in many cases, there is much doubt as to so much. See
Julie Holland, Should Parents Be Permitted toAuthorize Genetic Testingfor Their Children?,
31 FAM. L.Q. 321 (1997) (discussing the rights of children to privacy).
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an exceptional statutory power to protect children who are at risk from
parents who, for a cluster of factors, are incapable of making any
rational decisionjointly or in which a particular area of expertise makes
a referee appropriate and necessary.94 Thus, the selective appointment
of a referee for "exceptional circumstances" is not the unfettered
delegation of constitutional authority invoking the constitutional
problem of separation-of-powers.95 Indeed, the need for specificity in
an order vesting judicial authority in anyone is particularly important
because the court should define the "exceptional circumstances" that
give rise to the reference, the scope of the fact-finding and the area for
decision, and what issues the court is retaining jurisdiction to decide
after reference. The purpose of the order is to appoint the referee to
exercise "intelligent discretion in framing just relief."96
Moreover, finances should not be a bar to this remedy when
"exceptional circumstances" exist. If a party is indigent, the court can
pay the costs of the referee.97 The father in Rodrigue, for example, had
94. See, e.g., Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 771-72 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
In family law matters, especially where the parties are unable to curb their
animosity toward each other, the trial court may well find it advantageous to
designate a separate forum to resolve the parties' differences. However, the
authority of the trial court to do so is constrained by the basic constitutional
principle that judicial power may not be delegated. The trial court has no
authority to assign matters to a referee or special master for decision without
express statutory authorization.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
95. See State v. Boynton, 379 A.2d 994 (Me. 1977). The "non-delegation
-doctrine" holds that a legislature cannot confer upon another branch of government (or
administrative body) legislative power absent meaningful standards; though "the line
of demarcation between a legitimate and an illegitimate delegation of legislative power
is often quite dim." Id. at 995.
[When it is not] feasible to supply precise standards without frustrating the
purposes of the particular legislation.., the presence of adequate procedural
safeguards to protect against [an] abuse of discretion by those to whom the
power is delegated compensates substantially for the want of precise
guidelines and may be properly considered in resolving the constitutionality
of the delegation of power.
Id.
96. Adams v. Alley, 340 A.2d 201, 206 (Me. 1975).
97. The impact of public funding for referees in Maine has yet to find a reported
decision. The Maine Legislature, however, quite properly recognized its duty to make
services in the courts available to everyone without economic discrimination. See
Harrington v. Harrington, 269 A.2d 310 (Me. 1970):
Court procedures, at the trial level or in appellate review, even though the
result of statutory requirement, which in and of themselves invidiously
discriminate between rich and poor, impair guarantees of equal justice which
the Constitution was designed to protect. This is equally so in civil litigation
as in criminal prosecutions. An indigent litigant may have more at stake in
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enough resources to pursue two Ph.D.s rather than get a job. There is
no indication that either of the parents could not work a second job
during the off-month to afford protection for a child that their own
behavior puts at risk. Any sympathy for the parents' economic
constraints was unnecessary because the parents' willingness to expend
resources on themselves, litigation, and multiple experts at the expense
of their child's future interests should abrogate that sympathy. In short,
the trial judge has authority to compel priority for the child's interests
over the parents' choice to torment that child in selfish conflict.
The availability of a guardian ad litem is helpful (and important),
but the availability of a referee to parents of all economic strata is a
better form of protection for children caught in conflict without
recourse. Thus, a referee with special expertise in matters of par-
ent/child relationships may ameliorate the harm that ongoing indecision
or conflict can cause children. The delegated authority to render
judgment immediately and to direct its implementation (and in
emergencies, to request contempt enforcement by the supervising court)
provides children with an ongoing degree of protection otherwise
unavailable through ordinary court processes.
The availability of such services has, in my experience, the added
advantage of meaningful resolution of disputes by agreement because
there is no forum shopping, judgments are likely to have a consistency
of theory and sanction, and knowledge of predictable and immediate
results will yield a greater willingness to compromise and reform
behavior. Stated another way, the appropriate delegation of authority to
a referee makes it more difficult to engage in conflict without the
consequence of a loss of access or decision making authority. Although
far from a perfect foil, children will benefit more from the availability
of a resource that includes the flexible involvement of therapists,
guardians ad litem and educators who can assist the decision making
process but confers decision-making authority on a professional who can
act in lieu of parental mischief.
V. THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN WITHIN THE CONSTITUTION
Assuming the court's authority to delegate power to a
referee/master/guardian ad litem, the right to representation and a timely
a civil case than in a criminal case. Furthermore, equal access to the civil
courts was among the Fourteenth Amendment's primary objectives.
Id. at 314.
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(speedy) hearing for children caught in chronic conflict raises a critical
issue that bears attention.98 Today the guardian ad litem serves at the
statutory or common law discretion of thejudge to play an intermediate
(and often indeterminate) role by ferreting out information, gathering
evidence, and making recommendations that are intended to protect and
foster the best interest of the children." The duty of any advocate for
children has its greatest aegis in preventing delay when there is chronic
conflict between the parents, and this duty should extend to the court
(and those entities that fund the courts):
One issue which counsel for the children must closely watch is the
matter of delay in the resolution of custody. While substantive
protection is important, so detrimental is delay in the disposition of
the child that counsel must vigorously press the court in order to
avoid it. This is at least equal in importance to the right of a "speedy
trial" guaranteed in criminal procedures, for time is often even of
more critical importance to children than it is for adults. Vigorous
counsel and an alert judge must see that it is not lost.' °°
98. This section is a shortened version of arguments that appear in DANA E.
PRESCOTr, THE HYDRA HYPOTHESIS: THE MINEFIELD OF ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE, CHRONIC
INTERFERENCE, AND THE NEEDS OF CHILDREN, Chs. X-XII (1997), and Dana E. Prescott,
The Liability of Lawyers as Guardians Ad Litem: The Best Defense Is a Good Offense, 1I J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 65 (1993).
99. See Short ex rel. Oosterhous v. Short, 730 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D.Colo. 1990):
Indeed, the need for an independent guardian ad litem is particularly
compelling in custody disputes. Often, parents are pitted against one another
in an intensely personal and militant clash. Innocent children may be pawns
in the conflict. To safeguard the best interests of the children, however, the
guardian's judgment must remain impartial, unaltered by the intimidating
wrath and litigious penchant of disgruntled parents. Fear of liability to one
of the parents can warp judgment that is crucial to vigilant loyalty for what
is best for the child; the guardian's focus must not be diverted to
appeasement of antagonistic parents.
Id. See also Gerber v. Peters, 584 A.2d 605, 607 (Me. 1990):
An attorney-client relationship between the appointed guardian ad litem and
a parent is not created by the court's appointment or by a provision that the
parents be responsible for the payment of the guardian's fees. In a divorce
action the court has the sole and continuing authority to determine parental
rights and responsibilities with respect to a minor child of the parties, and is
invested with broad discretion in making this determination. The duty of a
court appointed guardian ad litem of a minor child in a divorce case is to the
court, and the scope of that duty lies within the parameters of the order of
appointment.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
100. Andrew S. Watson, The Children ofArmageddon: Problems of Custody Following
Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55, 56 (1969). See also Catherine M. Brooks, When a Child
Needs a Lawyer, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 757, 772 (1990) ("The appointment of a guardian
ad litem, pragmatically speaking, is a response by the court to its perception that the
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Over the years, I have argued in court (and elsewhere) that the
extension of "personhood" under the Fourteenth Amendment ("no State
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws") to children in school, juvenile, and abortion cases
deflated any arguments that the impact of custody warfare on children
is entitled to less constitutional protection.
Regrettably, any concern with the intrusion of government in
family matters as a matter of constitutional propriety cannot obscure the
fact that the volume and depth of family law litigation today encourages
such government intrusion into any case involving a decision related to
the custody of children.'' In that sense, the necessity for government
interference in the family occurs only because of the abdication of
individual responsibility. While the parents can choose representation
and a right to. due process in custody cases, children are subject to the
choices of everyone but their own champion in this sad combat. The
protection of children upon the choice of litigation requires recognition
of a due process right in civil family law matters: when the courtfinds
that there is risk that the child's relationship to a parent will be unjustifiably
harmed or that the child's present and future safety and well-being are
jeopardized by conflict, there is a constitutional due process right to
independent protectionfor the child.
A basis for each test may be found in Ingraham v. Wright,0 2 in which
the United States Supreme Court concluded that:
In any deliberate infliction of corporal punishment on a child who is
restrained for that purpose, there is some risk that the intrusion on the
child's liberty will be unjustified and therefore unlawful. In these
circumstances the child has a strong interest in procedural safeguards
child's due process rights need to be protected by independent representation."); Tara
Lea Muhlhauser, From "Best" to "Better": The Interests of Children and the Role of a
Guardian Ad Litem, 66 N.D. L. REv. 633, 638 (1990) ("The most frequent
characterizations of the role of a guardian ad litem are that of investigator, champion,
and monitor.").
101. The definition of these rights for parents has historically given priority to
biological parents over third parties in custody cases. In an important decision, a
majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected such a presumption; though
"biological ties" are of great importance, such "ties" do not trump the child's best
interests. See Charles v. Stehlik, 744 A.2d 1255, 1258-59 (Pa. 2000). This decision
will likely resonate.
102. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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that minimize the risk of wrongful punishment and provide for the
resolution of disputed questions of justification. 3
In custody litigation, the utter absence of procedural safeguards for
the child, unlike the principal's office after Ingraham, means that
children often risk much more of their future than "wrongful punish-
ment." The point is not the quality of due process for children but its
availability at all as a minimum constitutional safeguard in custody
cases run amuck. In Ingraham, and other cases, the Court has held that
due process is a "flexible" concept tailored to the specifics of each
circumstance, with the only clear mandate the right to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."°
In juvenile proceedings involving potential criminal sanctions, the
Supreme Court, in its seminal decision in In re Gault 5 refused to afford
juveniles all the procedural guarantees granted adults but concluded that
juvenile delinquency hearings must measure up to the essentials of due
process and fair treatment, including the right to counsel (court-
appointed or privately retained) and to participate in the trial process.
In this fashion, In re Gault"° and later In re Winship"7 recognized the
fundamental interests of a child to his or her liberty: "neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.
Although concerning itself only with criminal cases, the Court used
strong language to extend due process rights to minors: "It would be
extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the procedural
regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase 'due process.'
Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a
kangaroo court."'" Justice Fortas in In re Gault based his decision partly
on Haley v. Ohio,"' a criminal case involving the admissibility of a
confession by a fifteen-year-old boy in which the Court held that
"[n]either man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods
which flout constitutional requirements of due process of law.""'
103. Id. at 676.
104. See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 578-79 (1975).
105. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
106. Id.
107. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
108. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
243-45 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (collecting cases).
109. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 27-28.
110. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
111. Id. at601.
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From the school punishment to juvenile court to the law of
abortion, a majority of the Court has consistently professed little
reluctance to sever the rights of minors from the traditional decision
making rights of parents. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth,"' which concerned whether minors must receive consent from
parents before obtaining an abortion, the Supreme Court accorded the
constitutional right of privacy to minors with strong words: "Constitu-
tional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when
one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults,
are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.""' 3
Nonetheless, on a case-by-case (or situation-by-situation) basis, it
is difficult to recognize a consistent theme in the area of procedural due
process (or substantive due process for that matter) when applied to
children. Some would argue that Danforth, and the latter case of Bellotti
v. Baird (Bellotti I), 4 merely suggests the "proposition that the privacy
right of children includes the right to make independent decisions or,
alternatively, the right to have decisions made in their best interests.""'
There is no logical reason to confer a right to due process for
minors (of whatever quality) in every other fateful event in life except
the trauma of a custody case. "6 The question is the application of Haley,
Santosky, In re Gault, Danforth, and their progeny to a child's "right," in
the chronic conflict case, to independent advocacy in the form of a
guardian ad litem or, as asserted in this article, the appointment of a
referee so as to give children a voice in their futures. However
depressing, American society cannot ignore the overwhelming failure
of parental responsibility the last two decades, nor should courts ignore
decades of constitutional precedent applicable to the rights and needs of
children in all other areas of the courts.
A fundamental and reoccurring problem is the ethical conflicts that
continue to arise in the representation of children by the use of guard-
112. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
113. Id. at 74.
114. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
115. Harvey Wingo & Sharon N. Freytag, Decisions Within the Family: A Clash of
Constitutional Rights, 67 IOWA L. REv. 401,431-32 (1982). This article addressed many
of the Supreme Court's decisions that I do not discuss. For example, in Parham v. JR.,
442 U.S. 584 (1979), the Court held that the parental right to commit a child to a mental
hospital did not require an advocacy hearing either before or after commitment. The
Court's assessment of when parental judgment is less risky to a child reveals an
interesting set of values.
116. See Miller v. Miller, 677 A.2d 64 (Me. 1996) (holding that a child, as a minor,
has no right to hire an attorney without court approval, but the right to a guardian ad
litem may have constitutional implications).
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ians ad litem, who frequently must represent multiple children while
coping with parental complaints and threats."" A referee or a "judge"
has no such conflicts as she renders decisions based on evidence offered
in summary or trial fashion, but always with notice and an opportunity
for hearing. Future litigation will undoubtedly raise these arguments
and request the courts to explain the right to due process, procedural or
substantive, for children in every other context of potential harm but the
denial of that right when parents have elected litigation over their
children's best interests.
VI. AFTERMATH
The sheer volume of chronic conflict cases over the past twenty
years is depressing. Traditionally, most reported decisions are found in
117. See, e.g., Auclair v. Auclair, 730 A.2d 1260, 1267-68 (Md. Ct. App. 1999) ("the
[child's] guardian ad litem ... function[s] as an agent or arm of the court, to which it
owes its principal duty of allegiance, and not strictly as legal counsel to a child
client."). The Auclair case did raise the interesting issue of whether the private
attorney who was contacted by the children breached the rules of professional conduct
by communicating with the guardian ad litem's "clients." The court held that in those
circumstances she did not because the children were intelligent, mature being just shy
of young adulthood and the function of private counsel was solely to disseminate
information to the children; however, this would be a close call on other circumstances
for private counsel embarking on such a path if contacted by one of the parents. See
Auclair, 730 A.2d at 1275-77. See also Newman v. Newman, 663 A.2d 980, 987-88
(1995). The Newman court was concerned about creating conflict in the attorney's role
by confusing the role of counsel for a child with the role of a guardian ad litem or next
friend. The child's attorney is an advocate for the child, the guardian ad litem is a
representative of the child's best interests. As an advocate, the attorney should honor
the strongly articulated preference regarding taking an appeal if a child is old enough
to express a reasonable preference; the attorney might decide that, despite such a
child's present wishes, the contrary course of action would be in the child's long-term
best interests, psychologically or financially. In Vermont, the court has held that the
guardian ad litem is an independent parental advisor or advocate "whose goals should
be shaped by the child's best interests" and "the guardian acts as a buffer between the
child and the adversarial nature of our judicial process." See Gilbert v. Gilbert, 664
A.2d 239, 241 (Vt. 1995). Under current ethical rules, a lawyer may assume a certain
level of competency by the child to make the expression of those wishes clear and
rational. See, e.g., Joshua K. v. Nancy K., 549 N.W.2d 494 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996). Of
course, the more modem role of the guardian ad litem has also evolved into an
expectation by parties frequently (as well as lawyers and the judges) that the guardian
ad litem will also serve a role as mediator and try to bring about a resolution that does
not require the writing of a report or litigation. See generally Loretta W. Moore, Lawyer
Mediators: Meeting the Ethical Challenges, 30 FAM. L.Q. 679, 718 (1996) (stating that the
mediator should "strive to integrate the best interest of the child with the parents'
circumstances, rights, and responsibilities. The mediator should use his or her best
effort to assist the parents in reaching a sound agreement.").
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the appellate courts and those cases represent only a fractional portion
of the 1-2% of all civil filings that actually go to trial for judgment. If
the appellate decisions nationally are representative of the willingness
of thousands of parents to engage in the emotional and financial expense
of protracted litigation, what is the situation in the home for children
under such compression? The facts in many of these cases certainly
reflect an unfortunate and detrimental level of conflict.
And these reported decisions still do not reflect what many of us
know is the energy and expertise required by professionals from many
disciplines beyond lawyers to limit the conflict and prevent trial by
combat in thousand more cases. "' But the creative solutions of the past
few years have not slowed the rate of custody litigation. There are those
who will attribute higher levels of conflict to more joint custody awards
or the more active involvement of fathers than in the past (or stated
another way-fewer fathers walking away, willingly or not, from
parental responsibility). Toffler is probably more correct in that the loss
of stability for individuals within the family as the "great shock
absorber" of society combined with serial relationships, increases the
sheer volume of players in a child's life and with that volume conflict
is more probable.
As physical scientists explore the realms of chaos and complexity
theory, it may find a home in family law. The "transcience" of
relationships means that parents are introducing many more emotional,
psychological, sexual, moral, behavioral, and cultural variables into the
daily matrix of a child's life. Even if conflict between those variables
is inevitable, a parent's inability or unwillingness to act as a "shock
absorber" for his or her will yield more litigation. Selfishness and
narcissism are not pretty traits and when confronted in a swirling mass
it is difficult to educate parents while protecting children within the
current ethical, financial and constitutional limitations of the judicial
system.
Thus, our Futurist finds noticeable and remarkable patterns which
yield a paradigmatic shift in the role of the guardian ad litem for the
future. When parental conflict is unyielding, a guardian ad litem will be
appointed for the family with the authority to investigate, champion, and
118. As Professor Cantor has written, "the great difference between the law and the
other prominent learned professions, medicine and academia, is that the law is
intertwined with the exercise of state power and for the most part cannot be resisted by
private persons." NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAW: COMMON LAW AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 237 (1997).
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referee." 9 What this means for a presumption of privacy within the
family and how the evolution of due process rights for children in
custody cases will impact historical parent-child relationships which
traditionally empowered parents to act for their children remains to be
seen. But there is a cost: as parents forfeit authority, its dispersion to
third parties and their children will profoundly influence a pattern of
family life that has remained consistent over hundreds of years.
119. There will be a right to appeal but the right to appeal arbitration or references
is much narrower than the right to appeal in a non-jury trial. See, e.g., Swentor v.
Swentor, 520 S.E.2d 330, 333-34 (S.C. App. 1999) (stating that where husband and
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